Right of establishment
If we look at the company as a legal person and start to compare its ability to cross borders with that of a natural person, things may appear crystal clear at first sight but quickly become more complex, depending on how far we push the comparison.
Freedom of establishment is a fundamental right enshrined in the EC Treaty. This comparison between legal persons and natural persons is actually enshrined in the Treaty of Rome itself. Article 48 1 of the Treaty requires that 'companies formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member States'.
The combination of Article 48 and Article 43 ensures that a company of any Member State has the right to operate undertakings or set up agencies, branches or subsidiaries in the territory of any Member State.
By and large, companies in Europe have largely benefited from this freedom over the years. A look at the trend regarding intra-Community direct investment flows over the last 10 years shows that the right of establishment has been an important factor of economic integration at European level.
Obviously, this degree of freedom was not achieved in one day and enabling measures had to be taken. For many years, basically from 1968 (date of adoption of the First Company Law Directive) to 1989 (date of adoption of the 12th Directive), the EU approach to company law focused on establishing an equivalent level of protection of members of companies and third parties, a process that was actually inscribed in Article 44(2) (g) of the Treaty. It seems that at that time, this was also the lowest common denominator Member States could agree upon. A minimum that was relatively easy to reach as it essentially amounted to a replication at Community level of the main content of existing national laws, not forgetting some domestic peculiarities (which explain the presence of a significant number of options in some Directives -up to 40 in the Accounting Directives). According to some academics, the hidden agenda behind this approach was to stifle any possible attempt by Member States to engage in a 'race to the bottom'. In particular, France was concerned that the Netherlands which had a more flexible corporate law and an attractive tax regime for foreign companies would become a European Delaware. Whether such a phenomenon would have occurred in the absence of harmonisation is unclear.
What is certain is that corporate mobility was not high on the agenda: cross-border mergers of companies were only possible in a few situations, not to mention the possibility for a company to transfer its seat. The opening offered by Article 293 of the Treaty (ex. Article 220) remained a dead letter. That Treaty Article envisaged that Member States would enter into negotiations with each other to ensure mutual recognition of companies and the retention of the legal personality in the event of the transfer of seat from one Member State to another. A Convention on Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Entities was signed in 1968 in Brussels but did not pass the ratification stage (it is said that this was because in the meantime one of the then 6 Member States -the Netherlands -had switched from the real seat system to the incorporation system).
Has the situation evolved for the better over the last years?
The lines have started to move to some extent with the adoption in 2001 of the regulation on the European Company Statute, more recently with the adoption of the Cross-border Mergers Directive, and perhaps more significantly with the recent case law of the European Court of Justice (Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art).
The SE
The SE Regulation was adopted some 30 years after the Commission introduced a first proposal (1970) . That is to say: (1) after the Commission in 1989 completely rewrote its initial proposal for a comprehensive statute, independent from national laws; and (2) after a compromise was found on worker's codetermination.
The economic rationale for the SE was to offer a European flagship to companies, but mostly to grant them the possibility to organise their business more efficiently and cheaply across different jurisdictions. The SE Statute enables groups to merge their European subsidiaries with the SE. This consolidation process resulting in the conversion of subsidiaries into branches can save companies all the costs related to the running of subsidiaries in multiple Member States with different legal systems. No need for a separate board of directors, or for a separate auditor, no different accounting rules to follow, no need for a potential army of legal advisors on different corporate laws as all the companies in the group would follow a single body of company law.
As a matter of fact, the European Company Statute is the first piece of Community legislation that allows for cross-border mergers (this is actually one way to form an SE) as well as the transfer of seat of a company to another jurisdiction. In respect of the latter, it should be underlined that this transfer has to apply jointly to the registered seat and to the head office (real seat).
So with all these advantages, one would expect to count SEs by millions when we have about 90 of them, a few on paper as shelf SEs, but most of them active ones.
This discrepancy between expectations and reality may partly be explained by the delays in the national implementation of the Directive on workers' participation to the organs of the SE. The Directive was fully implemented in all 27 Member States only at the end of last year. So we still may see a surge in the number of SEs in the coming months.
However, some commentators consider that the SE is not attractive enough as its formation is costly both in terms of money and management time. The minimum capital requirement of €120.000 is viewed as too high for small and medium sized companies. A private limited company cannot be transformed into an SE (the governing structure is inappropriate). The negotiation on workers' participation is often seen as the major drawback of this European legal form because of its complexity and the time it takes to complete the procedure (often a year or more).
Furthermore, the question of the exit tax on the transfer of the seat of the SE is unresolved. Like for any other company, there is at present no system to ensure the deferral of the taxation of capital gains or hidden reserves. If no permanent establishment remains in the Member State the SE is leaving, the tax will have to be liquidated. Is this a reason why we do not see SEs moving around in search of the best corporate law regime? Or is it simply that this parameter is irrelevant?
In practice, at least until now, the SE form seems to have been used more as a legal form additional to or competing with national ones rather than a vehicle for mobility. This situation may change over time. In 2009, the Commission will produce a report on its ex-post evaluation on this new European legal form. We will have to consider whether some amendments are necessary to make the SE more attractive. Mme Noëlle Lenoir will provide us with some hints about this, as last March she handed over a bulky report containing a series of suggestions about this to the French Ministry of Justice.
The Cross-border Mergers Directive
However, with regard to corporate mobility, many specialists consider that most companies tempted by the SE as a vehicle to move their primary establishment from one Member State to another would rather wait for the Tenth Company Law Directive on cross-border mergers to be fully implemented: (1) because the procedure on co-determination, even if copied from that of the SE, has to be completed within 6 months, like in a merger operation, a longer period would be potentially be very detrimental to the life of the companies involved in the merger operation; (2) because the resulting company could be a national form of interest (a British limited or a new GmbH).
In the US, companies often use cross-state mergers to move their registered seat from one state to another. The same approach could now emerge in the European Union. It should in principle be sufficient for a company in Member State A to transfer its registered seat to Member State B to create a new company in Member State B and be absorbed by the new company.
It is still early days to predict who will use the Cross-border Mergers Directive and whether it will be a success.
The impact of the case law of the Court of Justice on companies' freedom of establishment
In contrast, the recent case law of the European Court of Justice seems to have had more impact on companies' mobility and freedom of establishment than Community secondary legislation. The Centros case 2 has been particularly striking in this respect. The Centros case concerned two Danish citizens who wanted to set up a company to run a business in Denmark but who did not want to put the money upfront to comply with Danish minimum capital requirements. Instead, they decided to register a private limited liability company in London with a one-pound capital and carry out their actual economic activity in Denmark as a branch. The registration of the branch was refused by the Danish authorities who considered that this legal 'construction' was solely motivated by the desire to circumvent Danish capital requirements and hence constituted an abuse of law. One could say that this only a matter of perspective. The Court ruled that it was contrary to the Treaty for a Member State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with a law of a Member State and that the legal construction (company in the UK and branch in Denmark) could not in itself constitute an abuse of right of establishment. The requirements set by Denmark did not pass the proportionality and necessity test. De facto, the Centros case had been seen as a green light for a number of people residing in Member States with high requirements and costs regarding the formation of companies to incorporate in Member States with lower formation costs, whilst running their business (assets, employees, shareholders) in their Member State of origin. Centros opened the front of regulatory competition between corporate law systems, allowing companies to go cherry-picking from their armchair.
With its decision in the Überseering case, the ECJ confirmed Centros. This decision was interpreted by some commentators as opening the way to the transfer of the real seat. However, it should be underlined that in the Überseering case, this result is that of the 'inbound' recognition of the real seat. As in Centros, the company was created in one Member State to operate through a head office located in another Member State. There was actually no transfer of head office from one Member State to another, but an issue of recognition and acceptance, without further requirements of the existence of the head office of a company legally constituted in another Member State.
With these recent cases, including Inspire Art, the Court has to a large extent weakened some of the rigidities of national corporate law doctrines and has moved the European legal scene towards mutual recognition of companies. One may wonder whether we have now reached a Nirvana where companies can move as they wish in the EU and in particular whether registered seats or head offices can move around.
As a matter of fact, despite the more recent case law, the Daily Mail jurisprudence has remained untouched until now. The Court of Justice has not clearly forbidden Member States to impose restrictions on the transfer of the real seat of a company incorporated under their law to another Member State.
7 Therefore, a company may be required to fulfil certain conditions when moving its real seat from a Member State in which it is registered if such country decides to impose such requirements (such as obtaining approval from certain public authorities).
Since the home country may have legitimate reasons to impose certain requirements on companies wishing to transfer their real seat abroad (in particular to prevent any cases of abuse) Member States should not be entirely deprived of the right to impose such requirements (provided they remain proportionate and justified on public interest grounds).
Conclusion: do we need a Directive on the transfer of the company's seat?
Then the next question is whether some legislative action at Community level is needed or whether we should leave it to the European Court of Justice to continue to extend the boundaries of the right of establishment for companies.
In its Company Law and Corporate Governance Action Plan of May 2003, the Commission had announced as a medium term priority the issuing of a proposal for a Directive on the transfer of seat.
8 This priority was confirmed by the public consultation we conducted in 2006 on the future priorities of the Action Plan, where around 80% of respondents considered that there is still a need for a Directive on the transfer of registered office.
9
In the view of stakeholders, the Directive would facilitate the mobility of European companies, in particular SMEs, and allow them to locate their businesses in the Member State that best suits their needs. Many of the respondents mentioned that the existing measures still do not provide for a straightforward transfer of the registered office (the transfer of registered office is only possible through a conversion into an SE or a cross-border merger) and, therefore, European legislation is necessary.
Several respondents also emphasised that there is still uncertainty on the legal and tax consequences of transfer under the present law and on the effects of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice on the freedom of establishment. The need for a Directive to ensure legal certainty of the transfer as well as to guarantee proper protection of the interests of creditors, shareholders and employees in relation to the transfer was underlined.
However, hardly any economic argument was brought forward to justify such an initiative. The main line is one of principle. It may then be more appropriate for the Court to express an opinion here.
The Cartesio case currently pending before the Court might provide this opportunity. The case is about: (1) the applicable law in the case of a company registered and headquartered in a Member State which wishes to transfer its seat to another Member State; (2) whether such a company can transfer its registered office under Articles 43 & 48 of the Treaty; and (3) whether the transfer can be subject to conditions and approvals by either the state of incorporation or the host Member State. Cartesio is established in Hungary which until now applied the real seat doctrine but has since switched to the incorporation principle. There is no tax dimension in that case and a priori the questions are focused on the issue of the transfer of seat
We hope that the Court will be in a position to deliver an opinion concerning the transfer of both the registered seat and the real seat. We hope that the Court will push one step further its doctrine on the right of establishment. However, how far it can go, we do not know.
The Commission has decided that it would not come forward with a proposal for a 14th Company Law Directive at this stage, considering the scarce economic evidence proving the case. Furthermore, it should be recalled that the Court of Justice should in the coming months give its opinion on the Cartesio case which may have a direct bearing on the issue of the transfer of a company's seat.
Nevertheless, a strengthening of the cooperation between tax administrations may be the necessary pre-requisite to lift the remaining tax hurdle, particularly exit taxation.
Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for your attention. I believe it is time for me to leave the floor to specialists.
